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Abstract 
This study is an attempt to elucidate the spatial structure of "Just-in-Time" (JIT)-based 
logistics for the distribution of automotive parts in Japan.  A diverse range of opinions on 
spatial structure have been presented in economic geography in the West: namely the ways 
in which implementing JIT causes the locations of parts suppliers to become concentrated 
or dispersed; and the things which can be considered as contributing factors in such 
concentrations or dispersals.  In response to this, the authors of this paper decided to 
carefully clarify the reality of such logistics in Japan by considering case examples of certain 
automotive parts suppliers which have implemented JIT from early on despite being located 
far from their respective car-assembly plants.  The authors will also shed light on the fact 
that, in order to accommodate distribution from remote locations, cross docks operated by 
third-party logistics providers (3PL) are located near car-assembly plants, and will seek to 
further clarify the functions of these cross docks.  This analysis has also enabled new 
insights to be gained: the fact that concentrations of suppliers such as in Toyota City are 
exceptions to the norm, and that instead suppliers tend to be dispersed over a wide area in 
Japan; the fact that, even in JIT-based logistics, economies of scale are being pursued and 
inventories are being stored; and the fact that in deliveries to car assembly plants 3PL cross 
docks are performing an important function in making small-lot, high-frequency deliveries. 
 
Keywords: Just-in-Time; Automotive parts supplier; Distant location from car assemblers; 
Punctual and frequent delivery; Third-party logistics providers; Cross dock; Japan  
 
1. Introduction 
This study is an attempt to elucidate the spatial structure of "Just-in-Time" (JIT)-based 
logistics for the distribution of automotive parts in Japan. 
In economic geography in the West, ever since the 1980s, studies have been promoted 
on the restructuring of industries and the shift toward flexible production systems.  Amongst 
them, there were many studies conducted from the late 1980s to the early 1990s which 
alluded to JIT.  These studies were accumulated as developments in research on the 
demise of Fordism.  
Some of the studies also presented a diverse range of opinions on spatial structure: 
namely the ways in which implementing JIT causes the locations of parts suppliers to 
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become concentrated or dispersed; and the things which can be considered as contributing 
factors in such concentrations or dispersals.   
However, much of this research has consisted of been case studies on the Japanese 
automobile industry’s expansion into Europe and America.  Even though it is believed that 
JIT first emerged in Japan and that this is where it has been most developed, there has 
been little investigation of the actual conditions of JIT in Japan.  Furthermore, in Japanese 
geographers’ studies of the domestic automobile industry assumed the implementation of 
JIT was supposed to be self-evident, and so there has not been any detailed clarification 
particularly of JIT-based linkages and the actual state of logistics.  For this reason it is 
believed that, in response to the great interest in JIT shown by overseas geographers, 
Japanese geographers need to acquaint people overseas with the actual state of JIT in 
Japan.  
Thereupon, in this paper, the authors decided to clarify the reality of such logistics in 
Japan by considering case examples of certain automotive-parts suppliers in Japan which 
had implemented JIT from early on despite being located remotely from their respective 
car-assembly plants.  The authors will also shed light on the fact that, in order to 
accommodate this kind of distribution from remote locations, cross docks operated by 
third-party logistics providers (3PL) have been located near the car assembly plants, and we 
will further clarify the functions of these kinds of distribution facilities.   
This analysis has also enabled new insights to be gained, including the fact that 
concentrations of suppliers, such as in Toyota City, are exceptions to the norm, and that 
instead, suppliers tend to be dispersed over a wide area in Japan; the fact that, for this 
reason, even in JIT-based logistics, long-haul transportation is being consolidated, 
economies of scale are being pursued, and inventories are being stored; and the fact that, in 
deliveries to car-assembly plants, 3PL distribution centers are performing an important 
function in making small-lot, high-frequency deliveries. 
During this study, the authors conducted numerous interviews with executives and   
logistics personnel at relevant companies, and were able to obtain much useful information.  
However, since actual volumes of traded and transported parts, transportation costs, ratios 
of distribution costs to production costs and other such quantitative data are confidential, the 
authors were unable to access such information.  For this reason, unfortunately, the 
authors were unable to include any quantitative analysis in this study. 
Following is a summary of the organization of this paper.  In Chapter 2, the authors 
briefly review the thinking behind the research methodologies in geography related to 
JIT-based logistics, as well as the results obtained.  In Chapter 3, the authors review how 
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JIT is being implemented by parts suppliers in Japan from both a historical perspective as 
well as a production/distribution systems perspective.  In Chapter 4, the authors examine 
the role played by 3PL distribution centers in making frequent punctual deliveries to nearby 
car-assembly plants.  In Chapter 5, as well as bringing these findings together, the authors 
examine how the distribution of automotive parts in Japan is likely to change as the 
automobile production becomes increasingly globalizing.  
 
2. The perspectives of JIT research in geography 
 
2.1. The definition of JIT 
 
JIT is a production/management system that was originally created by Japan’s Toyota 
Motor Corporation.  In most geographic research, the Toyota Production System is referred 
to as JIT.  Taiichi Ohno (1988), a former executive vice president at Toyota Motor 
Corporation, gives the following points as the definition of JIT.  a) The operational structure 
of a production site is managed by teams comprised of multi-skilled workers who have been 
trained on the job.  A multi-skilled worker refers to a worker being in charge of several 
consecutive steps in an operation.  This enables the type and volume of manufactured 
products to be regulated according to fluctuations in demand, and it enables adjustments to 
be made to the allocation of workers required for a job.  b) Total Quality Control (TQC) is 
implemented on the principle of full participation by all personnel.  c) Process control is 
performed based on a principle of JIT.  In response to demand generated by customers, 
JIT seeks to shorten production process times, and contributes to the company’s return on 
sales and capital turnover ratio.  At the same time as eliminating excess inventories of 
parts, JIT also seeks the efficiently utilization of equipment and labor.  d) Comprehensive 
cost controls are implemented to eliminate unnecessary expenses.  
To implement JIT even more efficiently, it is necessary for both car assembler and parts 
suppliers to be linked by an electronic information network, and to collaborate in a JIT-based 
production system.  In JIT especially, long-term business relationships are maintained and 
information is exchanged closely with a small number of suppliers who have selected 
according to such criteria as high quality, low costs and punctual delivery.  This provides 
benefits that can be enjoyed by both suppliers and assemblers in the way of profits 
generated through more moderate transaction costs and through a learning effect brought 
about by the accumulation of production experience (Monden, 1998). 
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From this perspective, many studies in economic geography in Europe and America, have 
perceived the concept of JIT as a composite phenomenon that includes: (1) changes to a 
company’s internal production system and labor relations; (2) the reorganization of 
relationships with suppliers and subcontractors; (3) the introduction of a Japanese-style 
production/management system; and (4) the efficient distribution of parts.  In this paper, 
since it is not possible to cover the entire spectrum of contributing factors, our argument will 
be limited to the spatial aspects associated with the distribution of automotive parts.  
 
2.2. The spatial implications of JIT 
 
In economic geography in the West, many arguments have been developed concerning   
the spatial implications of JIT.  They indicate the following four factors as the main causes 
for why the introduction of JIT encourages the build-up of suppliers in areas around car 
assembly plants.  (1) Not only are transportation costs reduced, but by making quality 
control and inspections easier, transactions costs are also cut (Sheard, 1983; Estall, 1985; 
Morris, 1988, 1992; Hill, 1989).  (2) The exchange of information is made easier.  This 
includes technical cooperation at the initial design stage (Williams et al., 1992; Linge, 1991; 
Mair, 1992).  (3) Relationships of trust are formed between customers and suppliers, and it 
becomes easier to maintain high quality, to make punctual deliveries, and to respond 
promptly to unexpected situations (Mair, 1993).  (4) Specialized labor markets and 
business-to-business networks are formed (Swyngedouw, 1987). 
On the other hand, views have been expressed that implementing JIT is still possible 
even in networks with suppliers who are geographically dispersed over long distances.  
Various factors are given as reasons for this: (1) technological innovations in transport and 
the development of telecommunication (Wells and Rawlinson, 1992; Gertler, 1988: Rainnie, 
1993: Morgan, 1999); (2) the intensive production of mass-produced and standardized parts 
(Reid, 1995; Glasmeier and McCluskey, 1987; Phelps, 1993); (3) the orientation toward 
sophisticated technology (Ansari, 1986; Schamp, 1991); (4) the orientation toward an 
cheap/obedient workforce (Reid, 1990); and (5) the small-scale nature of business 
customers and the diversification of risk avoidance (Morris, 1989). 
Among these arguments, there are many economic geographers who also believe that 
the implementation of JIT is embedded in the circumstances of each individual region, and 
that it is a model which is learned and which has evolved in a variety of ways. Their research 
suggests that the spatial implications of JIT would be diverse (Mair, 1992; Lung et Mair, 
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1993; Lung et al., 1999; Kirat and Lung 1999; Linge, 1991; Hudson, 1994; Sadler, 1994; 
Schoenburger, 1987; Lee, 2002; Boyer et al., 1998; Freyssenet et al., 1998). 
On the topic of the diversity of the spatial implications of JIT from a distribution-centered 
perspective, van Egeraat and Jacobson (2005) mention the following.  Through the 
introduction of JIT, if shipments are made more frequently, then transportation costs and the 
costs for ordering and assembling parts will also increase.  One measure to counter this is 
to attune and rationalize individual orders to match assembly schedules, thereby averting 
any increases in ordering/assembly costs.  Another countermeasure is to reduce the 
distance needed for procurement.  However, the following reasons can be given for doing 
business with a supplier who is located a long distance away;  differences in labor costs in 
the area where the supplier is located;  parts being produced in an intensive manner, and 
economies of scale to be pursued.  The accumulation of technical capabilities in the region, 
or historical circumstances;  continued Inertia of location;  parts mass produced with 
cheap labor costs may be supplied from a distance;  intensive production of high 
value-added parts also being performed at the distant place.  It has also observed that, 
when suppliers have expanded in scale and begin to deliver to a number of assemblers, 
they tend to locate away from their customers. 
Based on these trends in research on JIT, Dicken (1998) summarizes as follows.  In his 
research in economic geography, he compares the features of craft production, Fordist 
mass production and Japanese-style of flexible production.  He also compares the 
Just-in-Time system with the Just-in-Case system, asserting that it is premature to believe 
that JIT is a clearly defined production paradigm that will replace Fordism..  Then, as a 
result of technological innovations in transport and communications leading to lower 
transportation costs and improved ability to manage long-distance subcontractors, there has 
been an increase in the number of international subcontractors utilizing the cheaper 
workforces of developing countries.  However there is a range of arguments as to the kind 
of spatial implications that would emerge if JIT was introduced.  The reality is that there can 
be a diverse combinations of long-distance linkages and short-distance linkages.  JIT 
varies according to the conditions in which each industry or company finds itself.  Dicken 
argued that what is certain, though, is that the global economy is comprised of clusters of 
regional activity which are intricately interconnected, and that JIT is embedded in a variety of 
ways in diverse business-to-business networks. 
In the economic geography advocated by Dicken (1998),  as these business-to-business 
networks expand globally and reorganize, industrial locations develop disproportionately in 
response to political and economic factors.  Dicken uses the concept of global production 
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networks to explain the economic geography of a complex world; that is, the continuum of 
economic flow from raw materials through processing, distribution and finally to services.  
How the structure of business-to-business networks comprised of global production 
networks is shaped corresponds to the concept of governance.  Furthermore, the concept 
of governance is embedded within social circumstances.  Although businesses are the 
main pillar of such a structure, it is also influenced by research and development, by 
technological aspects of transport and communications, and by national policies and social 
systems.  In other words, production networks shape business-to-business networks, and 
while the location and behavior of such businesses are embedded deeply in society, they 
are also incorporated in systems of governance based on institutions, rules and conventions.  
Dicken then sheds light on the type of structure developed by the three powers of business, 
state and technology in the interactions between national, global and local economic 
spaces. 
On the topic of global production networks in the automobile industry, Dicken (2003. 6-34) 
summarizes: in response to the maturation, diversification and fractionalization of the 
automotive market, production systems have developed from Fordist mass-production 
systems to JIT, and thence to modularization.  The role of the state, in other words 
protectionism, policies to entice overseas companies, and policies to create regional 
integrated markets, also influence the globalization of the automobile industry.  
Consequently, the relationship between car assemblers and parts suppliers has changed.  
With the introduction of JIT, car assemblers now strive for close communication and 
long-term business relations by selecting a small number of suppliers based on price, quality 
and accurate deliveries.  Meanwhile, as car assemblers have relocated overseas, there 
has been a demand by suppliers for international-type adjacent locations.  Rather than just 
the cross-border procurement and distribution of parts, supplier networks are now framed 
globally, in conjunction with the exchange of technological, financial and human resources. 
Next, on the topic of the spatial development of JIT, Dicken (1987) refers to the following 
issue.  In JIT, long-term stable relationships are built with a small number of suppliers who 
possess superior flexibility.  For this reason, a geographically close relationship is needed 
between customers and suppliers.  On the other hand, parts produced in labor-intensive 
processes are dispersed globally, and are procured over a wide area from NIEs in Latin 
America and Asia.  This leads us to the question: how should we view the differences in 
this kind of spatial development of JIT? 
In answer to this question, Dicken (1992. 26-28) summarizes as follows on the 
procurement of parts based on the expansion of Japanese automobile companies into 
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Europe.  The JIT-based procurement of parts leads to cross-border rationalization and 
reorganization of management across a wide area, and reciprocal joint strategy ventures 
develop between car assemblers and parts manufacturers both in Europe and elsewhere.  
Japanese companies, while being influenced by the regulations on local contents, then 
choose whether to import parts from Japan or from European companies, or whether to 
purchase them from Japanese companies that have expanded into Europe.  In other words, 
various spatial developments of JIT are formed.  In the economic geography of the 
automobile industry, regionalization is proceeding concurrently with globalization. 
In economic geography, as an example of the introduction of JIT, research has also been 
conducted on the effects of overseas expansion by the Japanese automobile industry on the 
location of parts suppliers in Europe.  Since Japanese companies mainly utilized the 
existing network of suppliers, there was no locational integration of parts suppliers in Europe 
(Rawlinson and Wells, 1993; Jones and North, 1991).  In the U.S.A. especially, it was 
reported that, although there was locational integration at the state level, suppliers were 
dispersed broadly at the county and city levels (Bingham and Sunmonu, 1992; Head, Ries 
and Swensen, 1995; Reid, 1995). 
Furthermore, Japanese geographers highlighted the fact that Japan’s automobile 
companies, which have expanded overseas, and car assembly plants, which have relocated 
to peripheral areas in Japan such as Kyushu in far southwest, ensure the delivery of parts by 
using warehouses and by utilizing the “milk-run” method in which circuits are made to collect 
parts from suppliers dispersed across a wide area (Fujikawa, 2001; Ogawa, 1994, 1995; 
Saito, 2001; Nagao, 2000; Tomozawa, 2004). 
In this way, it has been shown that the distribution of parts procurement by Japanese 
automobile companies that have expanded overseas has been conducted over long 
distances and wide areas and with inventories on hand.  This seems to contradict the 
original objective of JIT in Japan, of “not having any inventories of excess parts” (Ohno, 
1988).  Is this overseas distribution of automotive parts just a reflection of the domestic 
expansion of JIT in Japan? 
In the following chapters, the authors will explain in more detail the spatial reality of the 
distribution of parts by suppliers in the Japanese automobile industry which continues to 
reorganize amidst ongoing globalization. 
 
2.3. The effects of modularization 
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In recent years, module production has been introduced to the production of automobiles 
and electric appliances.  A module refers to a highly systemized part that has been 
pre-assembled up to the stage immediately prior to being fitted to the finished product. 
According to Sturgeon (2002), a typical example of a module production network is the 
U.S.-model industrial organization in the electronics industry.  Leading companies are 
“deverticalized,” and they outsource production of their end products to 
globally-operated ”turn-key suppliers.”  This has the following benefits to the major leading 
companies.  They can concentrate on market competition and on associated marketing 
and service activities.  They can focus their capital investment on technological innovations 
in production.  They are able to avoid the financial, administrative and technical issues 
raised by fixed capital.  And, by being guaranteed massive orders, suppliers are able to 
acquire new abilities, such as improvements in quality and delivery costs, and the 
concurrent economies of scale and scope. 
In this kind of module production network, the sharing of codified knowledge becomes 
more important than implicit knowledge.  Massive volumes of codified knowledge, including 
prices, flow between a leading company and its suppliers.  In this way, a module production 
network has a relatively open character, and since basic technical processes are widely 
accepted and have become standardized, it becomes possible to transfer systemized 
technology between companies.  For this reason, there are minimal barriers to entering 
and leaving the network, allowing organizational flexibility.  As a result, these networks do 
not become tied down to any particular location, product or customer. 
In other words, geographical flexibility allows companies to expand or withdraw networks 
to/from certain locations.  This in turn permits even greater access to regionally-specific 
factors and markets.  Furthermore, systems can easily be transferred to lower-cost regions 
when available.  By having organizational flexibility, suppliers can more easily respond to 
the diversity of leading companies and products.  Suppliers shared by networks have a 
greater ability to adapt to demand.  The end result is that capital can be used more 
intensively.  
Concerning the effects of modularization in the automobile industry, Sturgeon and Florida 
(2004) write that globalization, deverticalization and modularization are three factors which 
can be described as being characteristics of the automobile industry in recent years.  
Underlying them are changes in technology and markets, and in particular, reductions in 
transportation and communications costs and the intensification of price competition.  As a 
result of globalization, while the automotive industry tends to disperse to locations in regions 
with lower costs, at the same time, economic activity in the areas of knowledge-creation and 
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technology development tends to accumulate spatially.  In this way, trade between 
transplants flourishes, and a value chain is formed in which production and procurement are 
conducted globally.  
In the globalization of production, companies make investments to search for markets.  
As part of that process, they expand into and locate to developing countries.  However, any 
reductions in costs resulting from cheaper labor costs tend to be offset by low productivity, 
deficiencies in raw materials and parts, poor infrastructure, customs duties and added 
transportation costs.  As a result, the pursuit of economic efficiency is pursued through the 
assembly of completely knocked down (CKD) kits.  Using CKD also works to eliminate 
excess production capacity at factories back in mother country. 
Furthermore, in the globalization of production, companies also make investments to cut 
costs.  With the progress of regional economic integration, companies locate and relocate 
to low-cost areas on a continental scale.  Low-cost production locations, such as Mexico, 
Canada, Spain and Eastern Europe are integrated into global networks. 
In global supply chains that have been formed in this way, suppliers co-locate close to 
new module factories.  One reason for this is because the module suppliers need to be 
involved from the initial stages of automobile development.  Another reason is that, 
according to regulations on local contents, automakers must control their procurement of 
low-cost parts from developing countries.  A supplier that is located close to an 
automaker’s design center acts as an intermediary between global sourcing and local 
sourcing.  Module suppliers globalize rapidly by uniting with automakers.  At the same 
time as centralizing at the core locations of automakers, they conduct production activities 
dispersed all over the globe. 
On the topic of supplier parks or industrial condominiums, which are factory configurations 
where module suppliers are located close to a car assembly plant, Frigant and Lung (2002) 
make observations based on examples in Brazil and France. 
Takeno (2001) suggests that, as globalization and modularization proceed, the future 
locations of automotive parts suppliers will change as follows.  (1) Small and lightweight 
standardized parts will be sourced globally from a wide area according to cost and quality.  
(2) Large parts such as the car body, which have standardized processing and assembly 
technology, will be supplied at the location of the market by suppliers located close to the car 
assembly center.  (3) Parts such as engines and transmissions, which require precision 
technology and massive capital expenditure, will be consolidated to technology-intensive 
centers in advanced countries. 
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In the West, modularization involves splitting up the assembly line and removing  
labor-intensive and unprofitable segments to external companies.  In the U.S.A., this has 
resulted in the creation of huge parts suppliers.  Modularization is especially suitable in the 
case of new plants in the West, where labor costs are high.  In developing countries, there 
are also assembly-production systems which can flexibly satisfy small-scale local demand 
immediately without waiting for parts suppliers to emerge. 
In Japan’s domestic automobile production, more so than modularization, there is more 
widespread use of unitization and shifts to electronic systems.  Rather than producing large 
modules, the preference is to make parts smaller and lighter, and to improve functionality 
and multifunctionality.  As a result of these kinds of parts becoming systemized, parts 
suppliers are progressively consolidating through integration, elimination and amalgamation, 
and their corporate groups are restructuring (Takeno, 2001). 
It would be difficult to say that large-scale modularization is actively undertaken in 
Japan’s domestic automobile industry.  The following are possible reasons for this.  (1) In 
Japan, the birthrate is declining and her population is aging.  Therefore, the prevalence of 
cars, including used car market, is widespread, and we cannot expect any significant 
increase in demand in the future.  For this reason, the automobile industry cannot afford to 
make new capital investments to support modularization.  (2) Japan’s automotive market is 
mature, and so what is desired in new vehicles is that individual customer orders are 
satisfied as high-class luxury commodities.  For this reason, rather than modularization 
which is oriented to standardization, what is preferred by consumers and what is consistent 
with market trends is differentiation by equipping cars with parts, which is oriented to a shift 
to electronic systems and unitization by which advanced functions and added value are 
raised.  (3) Since Japan has many suppliers who have historical traditions and who have 
built up sophisticated technology that supports individual specialized processes, it would not 
be easy to consolidate and integrate these into module suppliers.  (4) Japan has poor road   
conditions, making the transport of large module parts extremely difficult.  Another reason 
is that, since existing car assembly plants tend to be located in urban areas, there is no 
room to locate module suppliers adjacent to the assemblers.  Nevertheless, even in 
Japan’s automobile industry, it is likely that modularization will proceed to some extent, and 
that there will be further integration and consolidation of parts suppliers. 
Faced with a decline in domestic demand and an excessive production capacity, the 
circumstances of the Japanese automobile industry have been worsening since the 1990s.  
For this reason, some Japanese companies have formed alliances with Western companies   
promoting the standardization of chassis and exporting engines and other CKD parts from 
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Japan.  If anything, Japanese companies are now becoming heavily involved in module 
production overseas. 
 
3. The practice of JIT in Japan by remotely located suppliers 
 
3.1. Selecting target regions and companies 
 
In doing research on JIT, we must keep in mind the fact that JIT systems are highly 
integrated and organized systems that bring together the various internal and external 
relationships of a business.  In implementing JIT, car assemblers, suppliers, and  
distribution personnel are interconnected online and share an information network;  
ordering, delivery, production planning, production processes, and distribution are controlled 
and highly centralized. The distribution of automotive parts is more than simply an issue of 
truck delivery.  As shown in Figure 1 shows, in examining the distribution of automotive 
parts, this paper also examines the corporate group relationships involved in effecting 
parts-related transactions, the technological background, and also the characteristics of the 
production systems that interface with distribution.  For example, in forging a trading 
relationship between a car assembler and supplier, is there a contribution of capital?  Are 
executive officers dispatched?  What other affiliations or ties exist?  What kinds of 
technological features are there supporting the placement of orders to remotely located 
domestic suppliers?  When and in what fashion was JIT-based production and distribution 
introduced?  Was it based on the guidance of the car assembler?  This kind of 
background needs to be clarified. 
As the globalization of automobile production evolves, the production processes for 
important parts, especially those located domestically within Japan, involve the creation of 
electronic programs, and are characterized by being capital and technology-intensive, 
requiring massive investment.  In order to recover this capital investment, businesses must 
simultaneously pursue high-mix production and economies of scale.  Furthermore, in 
adopting and implementing JIT, businesses can overcome the risk of increasing labor costs 
attributable to the increased responsibility of workers, as well as the risk of unfavorable 
conditions resulting from increases in distribution costs. The suppliers must therefore either 
maintain a large share of a specialized market, or find a location oriented toward a cheap 
workforce, or save on labor costs by employing new technology.  Accordingly, in 
implementing JIT, it should be possible to disperse the locations of suppliers to a region from 
which parts can be transported within the delivery lead time. 
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The introduction of JIT involves a shift to an information-based system, and there is a risk 
that it could lead to business relations becoming entrenched within that network.  If 
investment is needed in production facilities which are for the exclusive use for certain 
customers, or on the other hand, if the suppliers enjoy an oligopoly, then there is a risk that 
costs will increase.  Consequently, in forming these kinds of business relations, rather than 
simply a problem of cost, emphasis should also be placed on the trust between businesses. 
Parts suppliers, which are able to locate remotely from car assemblers, do not produce 
large or heavy goods which are difficult to transport or store.  Their goods are also different 
to those, such as interior or exterior decorating, which strongly reflect the choices and 
desires of preferences and designs by individual customers at the time of ordering.  Rather, 
these parts suppliers tend to produce goods which are easy to standardize, allowing 
production to be planned ahead. 
In view of these prerequisites, the target region and businesses examined in this chapter 
were selected according to the following conditions.  First, a region was selected, which is 
located a medium or long distance from the location of car assemblers; where there is a 
collection of leading suppliers; and where the majority of those suppliers have devised 
distribution schemes to overcome their remoteness.  In the case of the concentration of the 
automotive parts industry around Toyota City, it is self-evident that it has been formed mostly 
from the dealings with Toyota.  The businesses selected for this study were parts suppliers 
which are situated in more remote locations, which have large capital bases, and which 
conduct a diverse range of distribution with a number of car assemblers. 
Second, it was decided to make the target region in which the parts suppliers had been 
located there from before or during World War II in other words, not having just recently 
located there.  In the case of businesses locating to remote areas in recent years, one 
contributing factor for their expansion would have been the availability of newly-built 
expressways.  It is already evident that JIT would have been adopted by these businesses 
from their outset.  Instead, by targeting examples of businesses and regions which have 
been remotely located since long ago, the authors can clarify the way in which JIT-based 
production and distribution systems have been introduced prior to improvements to the 
transport and communications infrastructures. 
Accordingly, the authors will examine the formation and subsequent development of the 
parts industry in the area around the Ueda Basin in Nagano Prefecture.  An automotive 
parts industry was located in this area in the early stages of World War II, despite its 
remoteness from car assembly plants, and over the years, the industry has nurtured the 
formation of business relations and relationships of trust with car assemblers.  The industry 
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also adopted JIT under the direct guidance of Toyota.  The authors will focus examination 
on two examples of Art Metal (AM) and Nissin Kogyo (NK), which are typical parts suppliers 
in this region. 
 
3.2. Reasons for locating in remote areas 
 
The area around Ueda City in Nagano Prefecture in the central region of Japan is an 
inland basin surrounded by mountainous terrains, about 200km northwest Tokyo.  The 
terrain is a high plateau, with a cool climate and snowfall in winter.  Numerous automotive 
parts suppliers located to the area around the Ueda Basin in the years before and after the 
World War II.  Together with the electronics industry, the automotive parts industry plays an 
important role in the regional economy.  However, the area is located some 300-400km 
from Toyota City and other places where car assembly plants are located (see Figure 2).  
Below, the authors will shed light on the reasons why suppliers have located in such a 
remote areas.  
(1) Historical conditions 
Prior to the Great Depression of 1929, raising silkworms was popular with local farmers in 
the region.  As a result, the sericulture industry developed, producing raw silk.  Since raw 
silk was a major export for Japan at the time, the farmers and residents in the region 
became sensitive to trends in international markets, and so a prescient and progressive 
industrial atmosphere was born.  However, with the Great Depression of 1929, the 
sericulture industry lost its export market and was dealt a devastating blow.  Then, based 
on the newfound surplus workforce and factory equipment and on the accumulation of 
capital, the region set about enticing the munitions industry, which was the growth industry 
of the time, to relocate there. 
Subsequently, during World War II, factories producing aircraft engine parts and radio 
communication equipment relocated to the region in order to escape the air raids which 
were striking the metropolitan areas of Tokyo and Osaka.  In 1942, AM moved from Tokyo 
to Ueda, where it began producing pistons for aircraft engines.  This move created the 
basis for the automotive parts industry’s location to the region. 
After the war, manufacture of aircraft parts for the munitions industry was switched to the 
manufacture of automotive parts.  As the demand for automobiles increased, more and 
more companies have ventured into the production of automotive parts.  Amid these 
circumstances, AM expanded its production to pistons for cars and motorcycles.  Then in 
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1953, AM split off its brake pistons manufacturing business, and NK was founded.  NK 
subsequently developed as an independent manufacturer of brakes for cars and 
motorcycles.  AM and NK established a number of sub-factories in the region, and 
continued to form networks comprised of large numbers of subcontractors.  In this way, 
numerous parts suppliers began to locate in the area around the Ueda Basin – not only 
suppliers of pistons and brakes, but also suppliers of door locks, horns, gearboxes and 
suspension equipment (see Figure 3). 
(2) The development of sophisticated technological capabilities 
Ever since aircraft parts were produced during the war, the characteristics of the 
automotive parts industry in the area around the Ueda Basin have been high-precision 
aluminum-alloy casting and the associated accumulation of processing technology. 
In addition, manufacturers of numerically controlled machine tools have also located to 
this area.  For this reason, numerically controlled machine tools have permeated 
throughout the entire region, from part-time farmers to small subcontracted factories.  The 
accumulation of sophisticated technology extends throughout the network of subcontractors 
(Friedman, 1988, Chapter 5). 
(3) Abundant workforce 
Although labor shortages have been a problem by the development of electronics 
industries in this region in recent years, previously, surplus workforces in rural areas meant 
a skilful and obedient labor, and that was also cheaper and more abundant than in 
metropolitan areas. 
(4) Inertia of location 
As suppliers with advanced technological capabilities and unique design skills, AM and 
NK have established within their own plants, design and trial manufacture units as well as 
other units that produce molds and machine tools for internal use.  As such, it would not be 
easy to separate the production processes from these units.  In particular, the precise and 
sophisticated processes related to brake controls and electronic integrated circuits could not 
be easily transferred overseas, even if the Japanese yen appreciated. 
(5) The pursuit of economies of scale in the production of parts 
Rather than dispersing production locations by locating close to individual car assembly 
plants, by ensuring the concentrated location of flexible production lines that can support 
high-mix production in the Ueda area, economies of scale can be pursued and the 
disadvantages of long-haul transportation costs can be compensated for.  Consequently, 
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by making deliveries to individual car assemblers in this way, both AM and NK have gained 
large shares of Japan’s domestic market. 
(6) Overcoming locational disadvantages: business group alliances (keiretsu) and 
technological development 
AM is a Toyota corporate group company.  Both, AM and NK are members of the 
Kyoryokukai (Kanto Kyohou Kai), which is an organization of Toyota-affiliated parts suppliers.  
Furthermore, as a result of equity participation by Honda Motors, since 1971 NK has also 
been a member of that corporate group. 
Honda Motors began business later than Toyota and Nissan, and it traded with distant 
parts suppliers belonging to other corporate groups, based on price levels and technical 
standards.  As competition in the market has become fiercer, Honda Motors has chosen 
large-scale parts suppliers with superior technical capabilities from both within Japan and 
overseas, and has made them part of its corporate group.  As a result, Honda Motors 
ended up forming business relations with suppliers who were located even further away 
(Mair, 1994). 
NK, being a member of Honda Motors corporate group (keiretsu), has many engineers 
and executives on temporary transfer from the headquarters of Honda.  Furthermore, in 
collaboration with Honda Motors, NK has also established a research and development 
facility and test course in a location which is completely different from where their plants are 
located.  The facility is located in Tochigi Prefecture, about 200km northeast of Tokyo, and 
its research includes the development of brake systems which do not slip on snowy or icy 
road surfaces.  Establishing a joint research and development facility this way in a different 
location compensates for disadvantages related to the plant’s location.  
In addition, as Honda Motors has expanded its Production overseas, NK has also made 
inroads in the U.S.A., Brazil, Vietnam, Indonesia, China, Thailand and Britain.  However, 
production of electronic integrated circuits for anti-locking brake systems, which require 
advanced technology, has been concentrated at the Ueda Factory where its headquarters is 
located. 
 
3.3. The introduction of JIT in production systems 
 
At AM and NK, the introduction of JIT was tried out at an early date.  Proposals for 
improvement (kaizen) were advanced from the production floor, and in the 1960s, delivery 
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schedules for parts were being rigidly adhered to through the introduction of the gaichu 
kanban (the process where production is only executed on receipt of an order).  “Gaichu” 
means “order”, and “kanban” refers to the written instructions for parts which are sent from a 
post-process to a pre-process or a parts supplier, when a part is required.  In JIT, it is 
impermissible to produce reserve parts in advance before a kanban has arrived.  Written 
on the kanban are: the type and name of the parts, the reference number, the required 
quantity, the deadlines for delivery (appointed times), the frequency of delivery, and the 
delivery destination within the factory.  Historically, kanban would were inserted into a 
plastic case, attached to the order and delivery, and would have traveled back and forth 
between plants.  Nowadays, the process has been computerized, and delivery slips, 
printed with the details of the electronic kanban, are attached to the parts being distributed.  
Furthermore, improvements in productivity and efficiency have been sought by 
manufacturing general-purpose machines at each company’s machinery plant to 
accommodate high-mix production, by improving the self-manufacture of molds and jigs, by 
introducing the U-shaped production line, and by making workers multi-skilled so that an 
individual worker can manage several machines.  A “U-shaped production line” differs from 
a straight-line production line in that when a part currently being processed is sent on 
“one-piece-at-a-time”, each part enters through an outlet near the entrance to the production 
line.  This makes it easier for a single worker to be engaged in multiple processes. 
However, fully-fledged JIT-based production systems were not perfected until 1976-77, 
following to the first oil shock.  The factors that made it possible were electronic kanban 
allowing the linking and unification of information networks between individual car 
assemblers and parts suppliers; the ordering, production, distribution and delivery functions 
had become highly planned; and the production of parts and finished cars had become 
interconnected under a consistent information system.  
Following the oil shock, by utilizing the electronic kanban with parts suppliers, Toyota was 
able to bring order and production information online, and to create an even more efficient 
JIT system.  It first adopted a policy of spreading JIT to local suppliers around Toyota City, 
and then, from 1976, it expanded JIT to all the distant suppliers that were members of the 
Kanto Kyohou Kai.  Taiichi Ohno, then the Executive Vice President of Toyota, was the 
founder of JIT, and was effectively responsible for its introduction.  With regard to AM and 
NK in particular, he spent two weeks in Ueda and directly supervised improvements to the 
production system, including distribution.  In other words, it would appear that Toyota 
considered AM and NK in the Ueda district as model cases in which to implement 
long-distance JIT-based production and distribution. 
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Then, following the full implementation of JIT by Toyota, AM and NK proceeded to bring 
online their order information with other car assemblers, and promoted JIT-based production 
and distribution.  In this way, by means of across-the-board implementation of JIT, AM and 
NK shifted to a more flexible production system, including the programming of production 
using electronic information, the introduction of robots and numerically controlled machines, 
technological improvements and shorter times for the replacement and rearrangement of 
molds and jigs, and a production line which accommodating high-mix small-lot production. 
Car assemblers do design medium-term and long-term production plans, but based on 
the information received from the purchasing customer, those plans may be revised,   
ultimately, production decisions are made five days prior to the car being assembled.  By    
programming production in conjunction with car assemblers’ information systems, parts 
suppliers can commence production at the same time as orders are confirmed.  In 
implementing production and distribution well in advance of this approximately five-day 
delivery and lead time, parts suppliers located in Japan are able to overcome the 
disadvantages of being located remotely from their customers. 
 
3.4. JIT-based distribution 
 
In 1962, during the period of rapid economic growth, there was a surge in the demand for 
automotive parts.  In response to this increase, AM and NK made capital investments, and 
the transport unit within AM was reorganized, resulting in the establishment of Art Kompo 
Unyu (AKU) in Ueda City. 
In addition to AM and NK, AKU has also been in charge of distribution for other individual 
suppliers around Ueda.  As well as pistons and brakes, it is also engaged in the transport of 
such parts as horns, door locks and piston rings.  Automotive parts account for 
approximately 70 percent of its transport volume. 
In 1976, at around the same period as for AM and NK as described in the previous section, 
a JIT-based transportation system was also established at AKU under the direct guidance of 
the then Executive Vice President of Toyota, Taiichi Ohno.  This was a system that 
centered on overnight road transport, whereby parts that were produced by evening would 
be delivered to a distribution depot (cross dock) near the car assembly plant in time for 
production to commence the following morning.  Furthermore, drivers at AKU are also 
responsible for operating forklifts during loading and unloading, which contributes to savings 
in handling and to reductions in overall distribution costs. 
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Parts are collected from the factories of each of the suppliers around Ueda and brought to 
the depot at AKU headquarters.  The farthest collections are made from NK’s Naoetsu 
Factory, almost 150km northwest from Ueda City.  It specializes in motorcycle brakes, and 
was located here in 1973, due to the ready supply of raw materials from a nearby 
large-scale aluminum refining plant.  The reason it does not ship directly to motorcycle 
plants in each region is that its brakes are combined at the depot at AKU headquarters with 
other motorcycle parts from other companies and factories. 
The depot at AKU headquarters performs a vendor consolidation function.  Scales and 
merits of transport are pursued.  Parts are collected from individual suppliers around Ueda 
and are brought here to be sorted according to the car assembly plant they are destined for, 
and consolidated and loaded onto large trucks for overnight transportation.   
Figure 4 shows AKU’s routes for middle-distance and long-distance mainline transport as 
of September 2004 when the surveys were conducted.  Looking this closely, the authors 
can observe the following three patterns. 
(1) Parts are transported to the AKU depot near the car assembly plant, from where small-lot 
high-frequency deliveries are made to the car assembly plant.  Deliveries to Toyota’s 
factories around Toyota City and to Honda Motors’ Sayama and Hamamatsu factories fit this 
pattern.  
(2) Parts are delivered to 3PL cross docks near the car assembly plant, from where small-lot 
high-frequency deliveries are made to the car assembly plant.  Deliveries to Honda Motors’ 
Suzuka Factory and to each of Daihatsu’s factories fit this pattern. 
(3) From the AKU depot, parts are transferred onto another company’s trucks and   
transported long distances.  Deliveries to Honda Motors’ Kumamoto Factory fit this pattern.  
The Kumamoto Factory manufactures motorcycles, and was established in 1976 in  
Kyushu district in the far southwest of Japan.  Parts are relayed from NK’s Naoetsu Factory 
to the depot at AKU’s Ueda headquarters and then onto AKU’s Kasugai Depot.  From the 
Kasugai Depot, parts are transported to the Kumamoto Factory by a separate trucking 
company.  Three days out of the five-days lead time is spent transferring the parts twice, 
and transporting them almost 1,000km.  This is an example of long-haul transport that 
arose because the assembly plant was relocated in a distant area. 
AKU’s Shiga Depot is also not located close to any car assembly plants.  Parts destined 
for Mitsubishi Motors are transferred at there to a transport firm designated by Mitsubishi 
Motors.  The parts are collected using the “milk-run” method, in which the designated 
transport firm comes to the depot, and combines the parts with deliveries from other 
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suppliers in Shiga Prefecture.  The Shiga Depot could be described as an intermediate 
location midway along the transport route. 
Let us examine the reasons why depots are used in this way along the various routes, and 
why mainline transport is consolidated onto trucks.  As mentioned previously, firms can try 
to reduce manufacturing costs by introducing JIT to the production process.  However, 
reducing the distribution costs caused by the introduction of JIT is not an easy task.  At this 
point, firms introduce information technology; they consolidate the scattered warehouses 
(distribution depots) in order to reduce the warehouse costs and land costs; and they 
consolidate and share transport in order to reduce transportation costs.  In other words, 
what happens is they try to improve load efficiency, and pursue economies of scale in 
distribution (Hamilton, 1995, 27). 
However, establishing these relay points has the disadvantage of attracting increases in 
en route handling costs and lead times.  For this reason, mainline transport is consolidated 
onto large trucks, load efficiencies are improved, and overall distribution costs can be 
reduced by making frequent punctual deliveries at final destination. 
From these perspectives, the authors can see that an important role is performed by 3PL 
cross docks and distribution depots run by transport firms, which are established close to car 
assembly plants.  In the next chapter, the authors will take a closer look at the actual 
conditions required for these approaches.  
 
4. Punctual and frequent deliveries to car assembly plants  
 
4.1. The system of punctual and frequent delivery 
 
As discussed in the preceding chapter, deliveries by AKU are not always made directly to 
the car assembly plants.  In this section, the authors will consider the reasons for this. 
Suppose that each parts supplier was to deliver finished parts one after the other.  The 
arrival and departure of trucks at the car assembly plants would be irregular, resulting in  
either a surplus or a shortage of space for trucks to stop and for the cargo to be handled;  
ultimately, the car assembly plants would need vast areas of land for trucks to park and for 
cargo to be handled.  At the car assemblers too, there would be surpluses and deficiencies 
in hardware and in labor for processing the loading, unloading and delivery of goods, 
leading to superfluous costs.  In order to reduce these costs it becomes necessary to 
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standardize and equalize the arrival of trucks and deliveries to the car assembly plants 
(Sugita, 1998, 1999). 
Consequently, in implementing JIT, costs can be significantly reduced by having 
distribution depots or 3PL cross docks of appointed suppliers set up in the vicinity of the car 
assembly plants; having them collect, sort and consolidate the various parts; and then 
having them deliver the parts at the time specified by the car assembler, in the specified 
quantity, to the work area for the specified process.  This system is called the “system of 
punctual and frequent delivery.”  At the distribution depot, based on information from car 
assemblers, the required parts are sorted according to each specified time, delivery point, 
and quantity, and are transferred onto the delivery trucks.  By consolidating delivery from 
suppliers in this way, car assemblers are able to manage their distribution costs better, and   
to collectively manage the costs involved in the procurement of parts, such as by promoting 
further computerization. 
Next, the authors will take a close look at the system of punctual and frequent delivery to 
car assembly plants that transferred from AKU’s transportation discussed in the previous 
chapter.  
In making deliveries to Honda Motors’ Suzuka Factory, AKU utilizes the 
Honda-designated 3PL cross dock adjacent to the factory.  From late night until early 
morning, AKU’s trucks arrive here from the Ueda area in Nagano Prefecture.  AKU’s 
drivers operate the forklifts and complete the unloading themselves.  Then, from early 
morning, the 3PL workers sort the parts.  In the case of NK’s brakes, in order to 
accommodate Honda Motors’ daily two-shift 16-hour production system, some parts are 
delivered once every two hours eight times a day, and others are delivered once every four 
hours four times a day.  Depending on the target vehicle model and the part types, they are 
delivered at different times and to different locations along the production line.  Before 
deliveries can be made in this way, parts brought in by a large truck need to be divided up 
small lots at the cross dock.  This 3PL cross dock is engaged in punctual and frequent 
delivery, daily sorting approximately 20,000 different parts delivered from about 250 parts 
suppliers. 
In 1971, AKU also established a distribution depot near the Kasugai Interchange along 
the Tomei Expressway in Kasugai City, Aichi Prefecture.  From here, it delivers parts to 
Toyota’s various plants located around Toyota City.  What is of particular interest is the fact 
that a single AKU truck follows a route from the Kasugai Depot that circulates Toyota’s  
plant, the factories of the major parts suppliers in the Toyota corporate group, as well as the 
3PL cross dock (see Figure 5).  This entails delivering the various parts transported mostly 
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from Nagano Prefecture in the morning, and in the afternoon, reloading the resultant space 
in the truck with parts produced in Aichi Prefecture, thereby raising load efficiency.  At the 
same time, the AKU driver operates the forklifts at each of these loading and unloading 
points, thereby efficiency is further increased.  In other words, it is a unique system that 
melds together the circuit delivery system and the circuit-collection type “milk-run” method, 
and is extremely efficient in that it utilizes drivers and vehicles for the whole day. 
In the case of transport at AKU, the distribution costs are paid the parts suppliers as a 
lump sum to the company to which distribution was first commissioned, namely AKU.  From 
this amount, agency fees are paid to the individual distribution firms and to the 3PL to which 
the parts were transferred.  In essence, all distribution costs are borne by the parts 
suppliers, allowing the car assemblers to avoid incurring distribution costs for parts. 
However, in recent years, the importance of 3PLs has increased, and then the collection, 
distribution and inventory management for parts is being outsourced to 3PLs, and the entire 
cost incurred by the 3PL for distributing parts is being borne by car assemblers.  In the next 
section, the authors will look more closely at the actual conditions for these 3PLs. 
 
4.2. JIT distribution using 3PL 
 
First, the authors will look at some recent studies in economic geography on JIT-based 
distribution that utilizes 3PLs. 
Fields (2006) examined the procurement of parts by the computer manufacturer, Dell.  
Dell has set up supply logistics centers (SLC) operated by 3PLs near its finished product 
assembly plants.  The 3PL conducts JIT transport of parts in the final sector between the 
SLC and the assembly plant, and deliveries are of small-lot and high-frequency in nature.  
The entire costs of loading, unloading and storing parts at the 3PL and SLC are borne by the 
parts suppliers.  Dell has six assembly plants on four continents, and for its globally 
expanding procurement it stores two weeks worth of inventory at its SLC. 
van Egeraat and Jacobson (2005) studied the production and distribution of computers in 
Scotland and Ireland.  In this case, several parts suppliers have consolidated their 
distribution centers into one or two massive hubs close to the assembly plant.  These hubs 
are owned and managed by 3PLs.  The delivery lead time from a hub is no more than 1~2 
hours, and high-frequency JIT deliveries are executed.  Consequently, the inventory kept 
on a customer’s premises is extremely small.  The entire cost of handling and storing 
inventories at these hubs is borne by the parts suppliers.  Reserve inventories are left near 
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the assembly plant, and while they remain the property of the suppliers, they are managed 
at the hubs.  The hubs perform the role of regulating the two conflicting functions of 
procuring parts from overseas and maintaining a high turnover for parts inventory. 
In this way, cross docks, referred to as SLCs or hubs, located close to finished product 
assembly plants, are playing an important role in the procurement of parts in the increasingly 
global electronics industry.  The practice of vendor management inventory has been 
adopted, whereby all the costs involved in storing and handling parts at these cross docks is 
borne by the suppliers, and assemblers are exempt from bearing the costs directly. 
Next the authors will look at the role of 3PLs in the transport of automotive parts in Japan.  
We will compare this with overseas, and ascertain if the distribution costs are being borne by   
parts suppliers or car assemblers. 
Figure 6 shows the distribution of 3PL cross docks are located close to Toyota’s plants in 
and around Toyota City.  Back in the 18th century, cotton-growing thrived in this area, and 
the area became a center for the cotton spinning and cotton textile industries.  By the turn 
of the 20th century, technological innovations in production saw automatic looms come into 
use.  Toyota Company was founded as a business of the assembly and production of these 
automatic looms.  Subsequently, a network of parts suppliers for automatic looms was 
formed around Toyota.  These suppliers had mostly switched from the cotton industry.  
Subsequently, with Toyota’s switch to automobile production, conglomerations of automotive 
parts manufacturers were formed one after another.  In this way, when looking at the 
build-up of automotive parts manufacturers in the area around Toyota City, we cannot 
overlook the way the automotive industry was formed, or the accumulation of capital and 
technology based on the cotton and textile machine industries prior to the introduction of JIT 
systems (Miyakawa, 1977; Takeuchi, 1971; Bian, 2006). 
From Figure 6, we can see that two 3PL cross docks companies affiliated with Toyota 
corporate group are positioned in several locations around Toyota’s plants.  One of these 
cross docks is a firm that developed from a forwarding agent of a local railway station, and 
the other emerged from a local trucking company.  In this way, many cross docks have 
been established as more and more parts suppliers located to this region.  This fact shows 
us that Toyota did not make the local parts suppliers deliver directly to them, but rather 
required deliveries to be made in a planned fashion, with inventories of parts being stored 
temporarily at cross docks before being sorted and delivered. 
Previously, Toyota promulgated a system of JIT production in which inventories were not 
held, and in which the entire cost of distribution of parts up to delivery to the 3PL was to be 
borne by the parts suppliers.  However, the Iwate Plant, activated in 2006, and located 
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some 800km north of Toyota City, was no buildup of suppliers in its surrounding.  Toyota 
consolidates the parts collected at 3PL cross docks from suppliers in and around Toyota City, 
and sends them in lots to the Iwate Plant by means of a special freight train.  As this shows, 
in recent years there have been instances when Toyota directly manages and incurs the 
distribution costs for parts. 
Next, the authors will introduce the example of Logicom (LC).  LC is a company that has 
set up cross docks in close vicinity to various car assembly plants throughout Japan (see 
Figure 7).  LC’s headquarters is located in Hiroshima City.  The company was originally a 
warehouse operator founded in 1954.  Hiroshima City is the home of one of Mazda’s car 
assembly plants.  Mazda has a relatively small market share, and its location is far away 
from any metropolitan districts in Japan where there is already an accumulation of 
automotive parts manufacturers.  As a result, Mazda lacked the necessary production 
volume and capital strength to nurture an extensive range of suppliers locally.  Therefore, in 
sourcing its parts, it mostly relied on small deliveries from far-away metropolitan districts or 
from parts suppliers affiliated with other car assemblers.  At the end of the 1950s, the parts 
suppliers that supplied Mazda made joint deliveries to Mazda’s car assembly plant by 
utilizing LC’s warehouses in Hiroshima from where parts would be loaded together onto 
trucks for shipment.  This was the trigger that brought LC into the distribution of automotive 
parts. 
In 1972-73, LC installed a computer system and completed an inter-system information 
translation system to connect the parts suppliers with car assemblers.  In this way, LC 
promoted the online exchange of order/supply information between suppliers and car 
assemblers.  LC then established distribution depots in various regions around Japan.  
They perform a vendor consolidation function, where parts are collected from each   
supplier by means of the “milk-run” method, and they are then consolidated onto trucks and 
transported between centers along main lines.  LC has also established cross docks near 
car assembly plants throughout Japan, and is practicing punctual and frequent delivery by 
storing and sorting parts which are brought in by truck. 
Particularly noteworthy was that, from the late 1970s, in order to compensate for a labor 
shortage, Toyota and Nissan established new plants in Kyushu, the far southwest of Japan.  
LC also expanded cross docks to the same area.  In doing so, LC undertook a lot of 
long-haul transport of automotive parts which were being supplied from parts suppliers in 
eastern Japan, namely, the existing parts suppliers in the Tokyo metropolitan area and those 
in and around the Toyota City, to the new car assembly plants in western Japan.  This is 
also demonstrated by the fact that a large variety of parts were being handled in particular at 
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LC depots located in western Japan, as shown in Figure 7. 
In terms of capital, LC is an independent company, and has no affiliation with any of the 
car assemblers.  Because of this, it is able to do business in an impartial way with all car 
assemblers and several hundred parts suppliers.  Also, in recent years, Mitsubishi, Mazda 
and Nissan have begun to outsource the distribution of parts to LC as a 3PL.  On such 
occasions, the distribution costs incurred in collecting parts from each supplier using the 
“milk-run” method are being borne by the car assemblers.  Figure 8 shows how in 
November 2006, in order to make deliveries to Mitsubishi Motors’ Mizushima Factory, LC  
collected parts from a wide area and brought them to a nearby cross dock. 
From Figure 8, we can also see that parts are being supplied to Mitsubishi Motors’ 
Mizushima Factory not only from neighboring districts, but also via long-haul transport from 
the Tokyo metropolitan area, the Toyota City area and Kyushu, and that they are being 
collected for distribution at LC’s cross dock near the Mizushima Factory.  This reflects the 
fact that Mitsubishi Motors is not in full and firm command of parts suppliers within its 
corporate group, and that, for this reason, it has to resort to sourcing parts suppliers 
belonging to other corporate groups. 
Furthermore, car assemblers have been increasing their imports of parts from Europe and 
the U.S.A. – Mazda through its affiliation with Ford, and Nissan through its affiliation with 
Renault.  LC has also been in charge of these international exchanges.  For this reason, 
LC is in the process of expanding its information system network for sourcing parts to 
overseas.  In addition to increasing the lead time for sourcing parts from overseas in this 
way, since many large-lot deliveries are arriving by container, the planned storage and 
sorting at LC’s cross docks and the subsequent punctual and frequent delivery are 
becoming increasingly important. 
In the previously cited study case, where parts in the electronics industry are being 
sourced globally, the entire distribution costs, up to the inventory management of parts at the 
cross docks, were being borne by the parts suppliers.  In other words, the vendor 
management inventory policy has been adopted, and assemblers are avoiding the direct 
incurrence of distribution costs.  However, in the case of distributing automotive parts in 
Japan utilizing 3PL cross docks, there has been an increase in recent years in the number of 
instances where the car assembler has paid the 3PL the entire distribution cost from the 
stage where the 3PL collects parts from suppliers via the “milk-run” method.  In the case of 
the automobile industry, there is a growing trend for the entire cost of distributing parts to be 
borne directly by the car assembler.  This point is at odds with the electronics industry in 
which vendor management inventory is practiced. 
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 5. Conclusion 
In geographic research overseas, it has been made clear that, in various regions around 
the world, the practice of JIT has been embedded into business-to-business networks in a 
variety of forms, and that the practice is also evolving in a variety of ways.  How then 
should we view the JIT-based distribution of automotive parts in Japan, which has been 
raised in this paper? 
Just like the examples mentioned here, automotive parts suppliers in Japan are dispersed 
widely in each region, as a consequence of the diverse historical context of sophisticated 
technology having been built up and specialized skills having been embedded in local 
communities.  Furthermore, the fact that the rural areas have been able to guarantee a 
workforce cheaper and more abundant than those in metropolitan areas has also facilitated 
the dispersion of suppliers.  Many suppliers previously dispersed across various parts of 
Japan concurrently sought economies of scope and economies of scale by consolidating 
their production factories and making deliveries to various car assemblers through the 
utilization of a flexible production line that could provide high-mix production.  Since 
individual car assemblers in Japan have set about a five-day lead time from order to delivery, 
no matter where the parts suppliers are located in Japan, they are able to implement 
long-distance JIT. 
In implementing long-distance JIT, information was brought online, and inventories were 
transferred, managed and stored in a planned fashion.  In other words, one of the 
philosophies of JIT, namely “surplus inventories are not retained” (Ohno, 1988), does not 
mean that absolutely no inventories of parts are held; unless a minimum inventory is 
retained, JIT cannot be executed smoothly. 
The following structure was designed for the actual JIT-based distribution of parts.  
Distribution depots were set up to perform a vendor consolidation function of collecting parts 
from various suppliers in a certain region using the “milk-run” method.  Between     
depots, mainline transport was operated efficiently by consolidating parts onto large trucks.  
Distribution depots nearby car assembly plants also serve as the function of a cross dock.  
Inventories of parts are managed and sorted here, after which punctual and frequent 
deliveries are made to the car assembly plants.  Information on orders and on inventory 
control has been centrally networked, and handled by supply chain management. 
In Chapter 3, we presented examples of AM and NK utilizing AKU for distribution.  In 
these conventional systems, the entire costs for the distribution of parts up until the cross 
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dock was the responsibility of suppliers; the so-called vendor management inventory system 
was being practiced.  Recently however, as in the example shown in Chapter 4 of 
distribution using LC, car assemblers have begun to completely outsource distribution of 
parts and the management of distribution costs to 3PLs.  This has resulted in car 
assemblers bearing distribution costs from the stage where 3PLs have collected parts from 
suppliers by way of the “milk-run” method.  In this way, there is an increasingly strong trend 
for parts-related distribution costs to be managed directly by car assemblers (see Figure 9). 
It is conceivable that these diverse examples of middle-distance and long-distance 
JIT-based distribution in Japan are also prototypes for the diverse JIT systems developed 
when Japanese automobile companies began offshore production.  At the same time, it is 
also conceivable that they reciprocally experienced and studied overseas distribution 
practices utilizing vendor consolidation, cross docks and 3PL, and that these practices are 
being introduced to Japan. 
In other words, the “milk-run” method, long-haul transport, and management of inventory 
using cross docks, which had been taken up as examples of JIT in geographical studies in   
the West, was being practiced even in the JIT-based distribution of automotive parts in 
Japan, and similar to the West, diverse forms of JIT have been developed according to each 
company’s circumstances. 
In Japan, the birthrate is declining and the population is aging, and the population is 
expected to decrease in the future.  Japan’s domestic car market is saturated, and there is 
little hope of any significant increase in demand in the future.  The Japanese automobile 
industry is being called on to rationalize its excess domestic production capacity, and to 
stand up to fierce competition from overseas. 
One measure is to locate new assembly plants around the fringes of Japan.  Another is 
forging alliances with overseas businesses.  It has become necessary for chassis 
(platforms) and parts to be shared and standardized with overseas affiliates, and for 
redundant models to be regulated.  There is a move also to source parts from overseas 
suppliers if the required conditions of cost, quality and punctual delivery can be met.  With 
the current trend in Japan, traditional corporate groups (keiretsu) are being dissolved, and 
parts are being procured from non-affiliated suppliers (Ikeda and Nakagawa, 2002). 
These changes are likely to have the following effects on parts suppliers.  If their 
customers, namely car assemblers, make inroads to foreign markets affiliated with global 
corporations and begin to product in overseas, then in response, parts suppliers will also 
have to expand to global locations.  The question of where to locate a supplier’s research 
and development center in the global network will also become important.  Furthermore, 
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suppliers will also be required to expand their scale of production globally.  In response to 
modularization and other new production techniques, suppliers will be faced with a choice of 
either expanding the size of their own company or forming affiliations or groups with other 
companies (Kobayashi and Ohno, 2005). 
Moreover, these changing circumstances are also increasing the long-distance trading of 
parts both domestically and internationally.  In other words, it can be said that, in sourcing 
parts, emphasis is being placed on economizing labor costs on a global perspective and on 
standardizing quality, rather than on economizing on distribution and transportation costs, 
It is likely that the conventional concept of JIT will be significantly changed owing to a 
notable increase in lead time, and by an increase in the short-term, temporary and market 
trading of parts that goes beyond, or possibly dissolves, corporate groups (keiretsu). 
As the Japanese automobile industry becomes further incorporated into global networks, 
the domestic distribution of automotive parts in Japan will be in a whirlpool of major changes.  
In the future, geographers will need to give careful consideration to the direction in which 
these changes proceed, and to the question of whether the examples of JIT-based 
distribution of automotive parts in Japan can serve as the basic model for supply chain 
management in the various industries across the world.  With regard to this, there will need 
to be an examination of and comparison with examples of parts procurement in Japan’s 
electronics and electric appliances industries, in which the horizontal division of assembly 
work with other Asian countries has been promoted.  The future themes will be to study 
how not only JIT but also the new production systems currently being adopted by Japanese 
businesses, namely modular production and cell production, are affecting the spatial 
structures of those distribution systems. 
 
Acknowledgement 
 
We have used a fiscal 2006 grant-in-aid for scientific research from the Japan Society for 
the Promotion of Science (Young Scientists (B), Project Number: 18720255, Head 
Investigator: Jun Kaneko).  We would like to thank Prof. Richard Knowles and the two 
anonymous referees for their invaluable comments, and to express our appreciation to the 
many people at the companies we surveyed for kindly responding to our requests for 
interviews. 
